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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). This appeal is subject to assignment 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended). This case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on December 3,2004. 
(Rec. 127). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. The Restrictive Covenants, in this case, provide for amendment in whole or in 
part by a majority vote, does this include the right to terminate the Covenants? 
2. The Restrictive Covenants, in this case, automatically renewed at 12:01 a.m., 
on January 1, 2004. Is the majority vote taken later in the day on January 1, 
2004, effective to terminate the Covenants? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The issues in this case involve the interpretation of Restrictive Covenants, 
which is a question of law; reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadows Home Owners 
Assoc, v. Wasatch Citv.. 40 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2001). 
PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented above were preserved for review. Plaintiffs filed a 
Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants, based upon the grounds 
that the Restrictive Covenants do not provide for termination by majority vote, but only 
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amendment; and that the Restrictive Covenants were automatically renewed for another 
successive ten (10) year period commencing on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., before the 
vote was taken on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 41-50). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings 
Introduction. This case involves the enforcement of Restrictive Covenants 
filed on property in Salt Lake County, known as the Quail Point Subdivision. The Plaintiffs 
("Swensons") brought a previous action in 1997 to enforce the Restrictive Covenants and 
prevent their neighbor Erickson from building a large workshop in his backyard, obstructing 
their view of the mountains. Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). (See copy of 
case attached, Addendum, Ex. "B"). In the previous action the trial court found that the 
large workshop Erickson was building was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants. 
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the trial court and then a 
preliminary injunction hearing was held on September 4, 1997, wherein the court granted 
Swensons a preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled, among other things, that the 
Restrictive Covenants strictly prohibited the building of such a structure; and that the 
structure was not a private garage, a guest house, or an outbuilding for pets as designated 
under Article I of the Restrictive Covenants. (See copy of Restrictive Covenants attached, 
Addendum, Ex. "A", pg. 1). 
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Subsequent to the court's granting of the preliminary injunction, Erickson 
caused Robert Campbell, as a newly appointed architectural committee member, to file a 
Notice of Termination of the Restrictive Covenants, dated October 3,1997. This was done 
even though the Restrictive Covenants on January 1, 1994, had been renewed for a 
successive 10 year period, through December 31, 2003. Erickson then filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint, and to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary 
Injunction, alleging that the Notice of Termination terminated the Restrictive Covenants. 
Swensons in turn filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Erickson's Motion to 
Dismiss and filed a Motion to Nullify the Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants, 
pursuant to Section 38-9-7 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). The Motion to Nullify was based, 
among other things, on the fact that the Restrictive Covenants were automatically renewed 
for a successive 10 year period on January 1, 1994, through December 31, 2003, and 
therefore could not be terminated by a majority vote during the 10 year renewal period. 
The trial court granted Erickson's Motion to Dismiss, but failed to address 
Swensons' Motion to Nullify the Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants and failed 
to rule on whether or not the Restrictive Covenants were still valid. 
The Swensons appealed the trial court's decision and on appeal the Utah 
Supreme court ruled that the structure was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants and that 
the Restrictive Covenants were not terminated, but were automatically renewed on January 
1, 1994 for a period often years. The Utah Supreme Court goes on to state: "the owners 
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have the power to amend the covenants, but only at such time as the covenants are due for 
extension. The last such time was January 1, 2004; we assume that the next such time will 
be on January 1,2004. This being so, the petition, assuming it represents a majority vote of 
the owners, is still invalid. The owner's attempted termination of the restrictive covenants 
is without effect. Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807, at 815 (Utah 2000). (Add. Ex. "B"). 
The case was remanded back down to District Court for the entry of a 
permanent injunction, which was entered by the District Court on August 31,2000. Since, 
the entry of the Permanent Injunction, Erickson again attempted to terminate the Restrictive 
Covenants by a majority vote which was taken on January 1, 2004. 
The Present Case. The Complaint in this matter was filed on February 6,2004 
(Rec. 1-9). Another Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants was filed on March 26, 
2004 (Rec. 33); and a First Amended Complaint was filed on April 27, 2004, (Rec. 10-36) 
seeking Declaratory Relief on the Notice of Termination. (Rec. 15). 
On May 10, 2004, Swensons filed their Motion to Nullify the Notice of 
Termination and their Memorandum in Support. (Rec. 41-50). On June 11, 2004, the 
Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of 
Restrictive Covenants. (Rec. 58-77). Swensons filed their Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants on June 22,2004. (Rec. 
78-106). On September 20, 2004, the court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Nullify and took the matter under advisement. (Rec. 117). 
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On October 25, 2004, the court rendered its decision (Rec. 118-121) finding 
that since the Covenants allow for a change "in whole or in part", that this is inclusive of 
termination; and thus the Covenants do allow for termination by a majority vote. (Rec. 120) 
(See a complete copy of the trial court's Order attached, Addendum, Ex. "D"). 
The court further ruled that although the vote to terminate was conducted 
during the day of January 1,2004, it was still effective. (Rec. 120) The trial court relied on 
the Utah Supreme Court's statement in the previous case, wherein the Court states: 
"[T]he owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only 
at such time as the covenants are due for extension. The last time 
was January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such time will be 
on January 1, 2004." (Rec. 120) (See Add. Ex. "B") 
As a result of the court's ruling on the Notice of Termination, on November 
17,2004, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal. (Rec. 123). On November 23,2004 
a Notice of Appeal was filed by Swensons, appealing the court's ruling and Order, dated 
October 25, 2004. (Rec. 125). 
Statement of the Facts 
1. The Plaintiffs ("Swensons") are owners of Lot 21 in the Quail Point 
Subdivision ("Subdivision"), and reside on the lot in a single family residence, which has 
a street address of 9135 Morningview Drive, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12). 
2. The Defendant, David V. Erickson ("Erickson") is the owner of Lot 26 in 
the Subdivision and resides on the lot in a single family residence, which has a street 
address of 9150 South Mockingbird Circle, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12). 
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3. The Defendant, David R. Limberg ("Limberg") is the owner of Lot 27 in 
the Subdivision and resides on the lot in a single family residence, which has a street 
address of 9144 South Mockingbird Circle, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12). 
4. The Subdivision was created on July 9, 1973, by Kirton Land 
Development and Investment Corporation. Harold M. Campbell and Mary Campbell, the 
owners of a certain tract of land located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more fully 
described as follows: 
Lots 1 through 52, QUAIL POINT SUBDIVISION, a 
subdivision of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, according to 
the official plat thereof on file and of record in the Office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
plated and subdivided the tract by filing a map and plat of the tract in the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah. (Rec. 2). 
5. Pursuant to Kirton Land Development and Investment Corporation and the 
Campbell's purpose of creating uniform restrictions upon the use and improvement of the 
tract, and for the benefit of all of the lots in the tract, and the owners and the purchasers 
of lots in that tract, Kirton Land Development and Investment Corporation and the 
Campbells, recorded, on July 9 1973, Quail Point Subdivision Restrictive Covenants 
("Restrictive Covenants"), which are recorded in Book 3368 at Page 429 through 432. 
(Rec. 2). See Restrictive Covenants contained in the Record (Rec. 17-20) and attached 
hereto in the Addendum, as Ex. "A". 
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6. The Swenson, and Erickson and Limberg, acquired their interest in their 
lots with notice and knowledge of the Restrictive Covenants filed on the Subdivision. 
(Rec. 3). 
7. In the past, Erickson, commenced building a workshop on his property in 
direct violation of the Restrictive Covenants, which did not allow any structure to be 
erected on the lots other than one detached single-family dwelling, a private garage, a 
guest house and out buildings for pets. (Rec. 4 & 12).(Add. Ex. "A", pg. 1). 
8. To enforce the Restrictive Covenants on the property the Swensons filed 
suit in the Third District Court, and obtained an injunction against Erickson from building 
his workshop. Case No. 970905359CV. (Rec. 13). 
9. After the injunction was issued, Erickson attempted to terminate the 
Restrictive Covenants by filing a Notice of Termination, by a claimed majority, with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on October 6, 1997. The Third District Court based 
on the Notice of Termination, dismissed the action; and Swensons appealed. Appeal No. 
980075. (Rec. 13). 
10. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the structure Erickson was 
building was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants, and further found that the attempt 
to terminate the Covenants by a majority of the property owners in October of 1997 was 
of no effect, because the Covenants had been automatically extended for 10 years on 
January 1, 1994 through December 31, 2003. This was a published decision. Swenson v. 
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Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). This is in the Record (Rec. 21-30) and is also 
attached hereto, in the Addendum as Ex. "B". 
11. The case was remanded to the district court for the entry of a permanent 
injunction, which was entered by the Third District Court on August 31, 2004. The 
Permanent Injunction also provides for costs and attorney's fees incurred to enforce the 
Order. (Rec. 13). A copy of the Permanent Injunction is located in the Record (Rec. 31-
32). 
12. Since the entry of the Permanent Injunction Order, Erickson and Limberg 
have again attempted to terminate the Restrictive Covenants by a majority vote, which 
was allegedly taken on January 1, 2004, after the Restrictive Covenants were 
automatically renewed for another 10 year period on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 14). 
13 On March 26, 2004, another Notice of Termination of Restrictive 
Covenants was filed on the property in the Subdivision, claiming that the Restrictive 
Covenants were terminated by a vote of the majority of owners on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 
15). A copy of the Notice of Termination is contained in the Record (Rec. 33); and 
attached hereto in the Addendum, as Ex. "C". 
14. The vote allegedly occurred on January 1, 2004 from 12:00 p.m. through 
2:00 p.m. The vote was not to amend the Covenants, but to terminate the Covenants. 
(Rec. 15). A copy of the official ballot is contained in the Record. (Rec. 34-36). 
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15. The Restrictive Covenants provide that as of January 1, 2004, they are 
automatically renewed for an additional 10 year period. (Rec. 19, Add. Ex. "A"). 
16. The Restrictive Covenants do no provide for termination by a majority 
vote, but only for an amendment. (Rec. 19, Add. Ex. "A") 
17. The Restrictive Covenants were never amended or terminated prior to 
January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., when the next successive 10 year period commenced. 
(Rec. 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Restrictive Covenants do not allow for termination by a majority vote, 
only for amendment before the next successive 10 year period starts. The courts in 
interpreting restrictive covenants have recognized a difference in a provision providing 
for modification or amendment, and one for termination. Mackey v. Armstrong, 705 
So.2d 1198, 1199 (La.App. 1997) The Restrictive Covenants in this case, do not provide 
for termination by a majority vote; and they were not amended before the next 10 year 
period commenced. 
Even if the Restrictive Covenants do allow for termination by a majority 
vote; the Restrictive Covenants cannot be terminated by a majority vote on January 1, 
2004, after the next successive 10 year renewal period had already commenced. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE NOTICE OF TERMINATION IS IN VIOLATION 
OF THE TERMS IN THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS. 
The Restrictive Covenants do not contain a termination provision whereby 
the Covenants can be terminated by a majority vote. Therefore, any attempt to terminate 
the Restrictive Covenants by a majority vote is not valid and is in direct violation with the 
terms of the Covenants. 
Deeds and restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as 
contracts. Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). Interpretation of contract 
terms is a question of law. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Assoc, v. Wasatch City.. 40 
P.3d 1146 (Utah 2001). Unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as 
written. It is the court's duty to enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the 
plain language of the covenants. Such language is to be taken in its ordinary and generally 
understood and popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement nor the 
words torn away from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon. 
Holladav Duplex Mfg. Co. v. Howells. 47 P.3d 104 (Ut.App. 2003); Freeman v. Gee 423 
P.2d 155 (Utah 1967). 
The courts in interpreting restrictive covenants, such as the one in this case, 
have found that there is a difference between a provision providing for the modification 
or amendment of the covenants, and a provision allowing for the right to terminate the 
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covenants. See Mackey v. Armstrong 705 So.2d 1198, 1199 (La.App. 1997) (as 
previously stated, we find no provision that permits termination of the restrictions. 
Defendants may argue that the modification provision is inclusive of termination; 
however, termination and amendment of restrictions are generally different and distinct 
matters). 
In applying the terms in their ordinary, generally understood, and popular 
sense, Holladav Duplex Mfg. Co. v. Howells. 47 P.3d 104 (Ut.App. 2003), "change" 
means 1(a) to make different in some particular; 2(a) to replace with another, (b) to make 
a shift from one to another. "Terminate,"on the other hand, means 1(a) to bring to an end 
(b) to form the conclusion of (c) to discontinue. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. 
The Restrictive Covenants in this case do not provide for "termination" by a vote 
of the majority owners only for "change". To change in whole or in part, gives the 
majority broad powers to change a single provision or to change whole sections. It does 
not, however, give the majority the right to terminate the Covenants. It does not give the 
majority the right to terminate the Covenants. Mackey v Armstrong. 70 So.2d 1198,1199 
(La. App. 1997). Therefore, the Notice of Termination filed on March 26, 2004, relying 
on a vote of the majority owners, is not valid under the express terms of the Restrictive 
Covenants in this case, and said Notice of Termination should be declared null and void. 
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II. THE COVENANTS CANNOT BE TERMINATED 
BY MAJORITY VOTE AFTER THEY WERE 
AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED ON JANUARY 1, 2004. 
The courts in reviewing restrictive covenants, with similar language to the 
Restrictive Covenants in this case, have held that the amendment must be voted on and 
ratified by the majority before the automatic renewal period commences. City of Gulf 
Port v.Wilson. 603 P.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992). 
According to the terms of the Restrictive Covenants, in this case, they were 
automatically renewed for a successive 10 year period, commencing January 1, 2004. 
Therefore, the Covenants were automatically renewed on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m.; 
and any attempt to modify (or terminate) by a majority vote after the renewal period 
commenced on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., will not take effect until the end of the 
nextlO year renewal period. See City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295 (Miss. 1992) 
wherein the court held that where a restrictive covenant was automatically extended for 
successive periods often years, as in this case, and is silent as to when the vote must take 
place, it was reasonable for the amendment to be voted on before the expiration of the 
term so that the covenant would not automatically renew for another ten years.1 Cf. 
Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners. 999 P.2d 393 (Ariz.App. 1995) (an amendment to 
!The court further stated that if the amendment was not already voted on and 
ratified to go into effect on January 1, 1985, then the old covenant would automatically 
renew on that date and go into effect for another 10 years. Id. at 300. There was no prior 
vote or ratification in this case. 
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restrictive covenants approved during the running of an extension period would become 
effective at the start of the next successive period) and Pearce v. Scarcello, 920 S.W.2d. 
643 (Mo.App. 1996) (an amendment to a restrictive covenant made during the term by 
less than a unanimous consent, became effective at the end of that term and not before) 
The trial court misread the Utah Supreme Court's statements in the previous 
case ofSwensonv.Erickson. 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). The Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the next time an amendment to the Covenants by a majority vote could take effect 
would be on January 1, 2004. The Court did not rule that the vote, in order to effect such 
change, would have to be conducted on January 1, 2004. 
Even the Defendants in filing for a Petition for Rehearing in the previous 
case, recognized this long line of cases; and argued that if they met and voted on January 
1,2004, it would be too late, as the Covenants would already be automatically renewed 
for an additional 10 year period.2 (Rec. 84, 105-106). 
Therefore, based on the forgoing, even if this Court interprets the 
Restrictive Covenants, in this case, as to allow for complete termination by majority vote; 
since the majority vote did not occur until after the start of the 10 year renewal period on 
January 1, 2004; such action cannot take effective until the start of the next 10 year 
2The Petition for Rehearing was denied. The vote at issue in that case was not to 
take effect on January 1, 2004. However, the legal argument is consistent with the law. 
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renewal period and the Notice of Termination filed on the property on March 26, 2004, 
should be declared null and void. 
CONCLUSION 
The terms "change" and "termination" have two distinct meanings. The 
Restrictive Covenants in this case do not provide for complete "termination" by majority 
vote. 
Even if complete termination is allowed by majority vote under the terms of 
the Restrictive Covenants, the Restrictive Covenants were automatically renewed for 
another 10 year period on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., and therefore, any vote taken 
after this renewal, cannot take effect until the start of the next renewal period on January 
1,2014. 
Based on the forgoing the ruling of the district court should be reversed and 
the Notice of Termination filed on March 26,2004, should be declared null and void. 
DATED this J?j? day of March, 2005. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
eWTCafl 
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K7RTON LAND AND I N V E S T M E N T CORPOILATION, a c o r p o r a -
t l o a o l Utah, with He pr inc ipa l p l a c e of b u s i n e s s In Sal t Lake Chy> Salt 
Lake- County > State of Utah, a n d HAROLD M. C A M P B E L L aod MARY 
CA MPBELL, hie wile, the owners of the following described real prop-
e r t y a Itu&ted In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wil: 
LotB 1 through 52. QUAIL POINT SUB-
DIVISION, a subdivision of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, according to the 
official pit! thereof on die and of record 
in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder; 
doe« herehj place the hereinafter designated restrict ive covenants upon 
a l l of the lota of said subdivision. 
^r 
Lots 1 through 52 shall be known a£ ''residential lote.1 ' J£Q_ 
-structure shall be erectedr a l tered, placed or permitted to rcrrEain on 
p-ny residential lot*' otber^han one detechecTiinffle family dy elling,. a. 
JEUJL&SJtj^ jgarag^ . a guest hou&e and outbuildings for peta ag hereinafter"" 
descr ibed. x~~ 
^ No residential structure,, nor any part thereof shal l be erected, 
a l tered , placed or permitted to remain on any parcel of land containing 
l e s s than an entire residential lot {unleaa aald parcel ahall have a width 
of at l eas t 105 feet at the.front bntlding Set back H n i 
- * Ne building shall be erected, placed, or altered on any p r e m i s e s 
in sa id development until the building plane, specif icat ion^ xn6 plot plana 
showing the location of such building have been approved ae to conformity 
and harmony of external design with existing structures In the deve lop-
ment, and as to location of the building with reaped to topography and 
-flnlsherd groand elevation by an architectural committee composed of 
CHARLES R_ KIRTON and other m e m b e r s selected by htJDo or by a r e p r e -
sentat ive deaignated by the member* of said committee , [Q the event of 
death or resignation of any membero of Raid committee , the remaining 
member , or members, «hall have Xull authority to approve or disapprove 
*nch design and location or to designate a representative with like 
authority. la the event a l l the mocnber* of aald committee die o r In the 
«Vent the committee ceaacii to function, then 60 percent of the owners of thi 
lotu ID *ald *ubdivtjjion ahall bar© the right tc> o l c d a committee- In 
event Uftld committee, or i t s designated representative falls to approve 
or disapprove *nch design and location 3 0 d a y e after sa id plans and ape 
-flcationa have been Mubmltted to it, or In «my event, If no apJt to enjoin 
the erect ion of auch building or the making of *tjtch alterations have bee 
commenced prior to the completion.thereor, &nch approval will not be 
require*! pj>d thl* coir«»narxt wil l be doomed to have bo«n fully coropU^d 
with* Neither the mcraberfi of such HJUIUJIIILL JJUI till Umlflfited 
I EXHIBIT NO_ <^U 8 . 5h>€^&QA/ " T T 
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1 
Z 
B 
4 
S 
£ 
7 
8 
representa t ive shall be entitled to any compensation for services performed 
pursuant to this covenant This committee shall have the right to vary the 
requ irements a s set forth jo Section H, but said variance tfhall not be valid 
u n l e s s obtained In writing 
n 
J5«-ory detached single fn rally duel l ing erected on any one of the 
above -descr ibed residential lots shall have & xniaJLco-tu=o Rre* above the 
ground of 1,250 sqaare feet, exclasfva of garages and open porch.cn. No 
t w o - s t o r y etraciarcs jshall he built on any lot without the exprett consent 
of t h e a rchite-ctural committee- Said consent ©ball be granted only-where 
it £B deemed by the architectural committee that the second storj shall not 
a d v e r s e l y Effect the view of the city or maimtsJn.8 from the other late . 
fO j 
II 
tz 
IS 
t% 
16 
rr\ 
f 
zo 
zz 
X* 
*A 
ZJS 
* « 
B O j 
S I | 
§&£*OT«aa» 
ra 
N o outbuilding- shall be erected., a l tered, placed or p^rxnltted 
to r e m a i n nearer than eight (8) feet lo c ither s ide line of A lot unless no 
port ion of said building- extends nearer to the street l ine than sLr^y-Uve (55) 
f e e t . 
* 
T h e minimum «7de yard far any dwell ing she l l be eight (£) feet-
IV 
No residential structure Khali be erected or placed on any building 
site,, which baa an area cf l e ss than B, 000 square feet . 
^ 
N o noxious or offensive tnuie or activity shal l be carried on upon 
*uay building s i te nor shall anything be -done thereon which may be o r b e -
c o m e an annoyance or nuisance to the neighbor hood * 
VI 
N o trailer, ba.sernent„ tent, sbuiclc, garage , barn or other out -
building erected on a building Site c o v t r c d by these covenants shall at any 
t ime be tinc-d for human habitation temporar i ly or p^rnxanently, nor ah al l 
a n y e r t r u c t u r e of a t e m p o r a r y char -Ar^er b e usaed f o r h u m e r i habi ta t ion* 
vn 
Easements ara reserved as sbc/wn on tho recorded pi*)- Inr i>Hi>ty 
Instal lat ion, pipel ines, ditches, ana" malnte JJJ>en* Nothing m this p c n i -
graph contained shal l be interpreted a s prohibiting construction of wallcs, 
d r i v e w a y s , porches , e tc . , over »ach eaficmenta, subject to the rights of 
thos% with easements to rnakie netc«*ssLry r e p a i r s and conduct accessary 
^^*XTxt-«nOua.n.oo a l o n g - • t u c H «ML*©mc:rU.«. 
VDG: 
N o animal* or poultry of any kind other than houe* pets *H»1X bo k.<e:pt , 
err comintalo^d cm any part of said property . 
- 2 -
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IX 
K o f e n c e o r w a l l shal l b e erec ted , p l a c e d or a l t e r e d on ary lot 
n f e i r t r t o a n y &tr£ct than th* min imum bu i ld ing s e t b a c k l i n e -withoot 
a p p r o v a l a. a h e r e i n a f t e r s e t forth. 
N o f e n c e , v^alta* o r hedge over s i x (6) f e e t U he ight fina^l be 
e r e c t e d o r g r o w n at a n y place on said p r e m i s e s ; provided, , however* that 
the r e s t r i c t ! o r i s s e t for th In ta is Bection m a y be w a i v e d or nullified by 
conoent of a r c h i t e c t u r a l commUtere o r by t h e orrnorfi of xdo-T^ thiin fifty (50) 
p e r c e n t oi the n u m b e r e d lots within th i s sab&Ivis ion obfcout>ed in writing. 
X 
N o s t r u c t u r e c h a l l be moved on to E.ny r e s i d e n t i a l bi i l ldingBitc 
h e r e i n b e f o r e d e s c r i b e d o r any part t h e r e o f u n l e s s u m e e t s wi th the 
a p p r o v a l o f o n e h u n d r e d percent (100%) of the f e e U t i e ho lderB of other l o t s 
i n th i s s u b d i v i s i o n ^ s u c h approval to be given, i n w r l t : o £ . 
XI 
N o s i g n o f a c y kind ektJX be d i s p l a y e d to the p u b l i c v i e w oti &rrjr 
l o t e x c e p t cttfc p r o f e s s i o n a l e ign of not m o r e Lhn.n one s q u a r e foot, one 
s i g n of not m o r e than f i v e square f e e t , a d v e r t i s i n g t h e p r o p e r t y for ftale 
o r r e n t , o r s i g n s u s e d by builder to a d v e r t i s e tbc p r o p e r t y duriirg c o n -
s t r u c t i o n and atal-ea p e r i o d . 
xn 
OH d r i l l i n g , o i l development o p e r a t i o n s ; r e f i n i n g m i n i n g operat ions 
of any k ind , o r q u a r r y t o g saaH not be p e r m i t t e d apox> or i n any of the 
bu i ld ing s i t e * In the t r a c t descr ibed h e r e i n , n o r s h a l l o i l w e l l s , tanks., 
tunnels, , m i n e r a l e x c a v a t i o n s o r JBhafts b e p e r m i t t e d upon o r in Bay of the 
building" sites c o v e r e d by these c o v e n a n t s , 
Xt l l 
N o lo t s h a l l b e vus.td o r mainta ined a s a dumpir^g g r o u n d for rubbish; 
t r a 3 h , g a r b a g e o r o t h e r waste sha.ll not be k e p i e x c e p t in sanitary c o n t a i n e r s . 
A H i n c i n e r a t o r s o r otJher equipment for the" s t o r a g e o r diftpoB&l af such 
m a t e r i a l s h a l l be kept in a c l e a n and s a n i t a r y c o n d i t i o n . 
XIV 
T h e s o c o v e n a n t s are t o run wi th t h e l a n d and sha l l be binding on 
a l l p a r t i e s *.i*d a l l p e r s o n s c l a i m i n g u n d e r t h e m unt i l J a n u a r y 1, 1&&4, a t 
w h i c h t i m e maid c o v e n a n t e s h a l l be a u t o m a t i c a l l y e x t e n d e d for * t c c e 8 3 i v r 
p e r l o d x o f 10 y e a r n u n l e s e by vote of a m a j o r i t y of the then owntrs of the 
bui ld ing s i t e s c o v e r e d by these covenant*! It Is Agreed to c h a n g e sa id c o v e -
nants in WHDIO o r p a r t . 
9fz
 I f th* paxtlca hereto «xy ^ T t Z ^ ^ t * h.r-lo. H »b*ll 
JuOl viotate or- -tt^pt to vLol*te • " * ~ i
 a n y r « a property 
be l a ^ u l f o r a n y o t h e r person or * « ^ f ^ J ^ * t l a * or I. equity 
. I t a a t e d in « L d t r a c t , to
 P ro B eCut* any p r o c o o nfi 
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a g a i n s t the p e r s o n o r persons v io la t ing o r a t t e m p t i e s : to v i o l a t e anj such 
c o v e n a n t , and e i t h e r to prevent h i m o r thero f rorn s o d o i n g or to recover 
d&xrmgee o r o t h e r dues Tor such v io la t ion . 
Inva l idat ion of any ooe of theee c o v e n a n t s o r any p a r t thereof by 
j u d g m e n t s o r c o u r t o r d e r shall In no yd&e a f f e c t .any of t b e o ther provi-
s i o n s w h i c h s h a l l rc ix i i in ID kill f o r c e and e f f e c t * 
IN "WITNESS WHKRKOF, KIRTON L A N D AND INVESTMENT 
COJRPORATION a n d HAROLD ML CAMPBELL, and MARY CAMPBELL, h i e 
w i f e , h a r e h e r e u n t o &et their h&nda and o f f i c i a l s e a l this 
J u l y 1 9 7 3 . 
i ( day o f 
KIRTON L A N D A N D INVESTMENT 
C O R P O R A T I O N 
IT j 
IB 
xoj 
Z2 
ZB j 
2 7 
IC 
£ 9 
SO 
s i 
X2 
% ^ - 1 
B*W£ C^RL^5?H^K^o!C TrcMdc^rT 
' » O T O I * portm 
*no*»**x* *T urn 
Xtt A. THU*> *ATT 
uur unci enr, ITDIK 
'
yJJ.lf~ 
^ EAJELOL^S 
--u~* Cr 
MA: ir O ^ -C A M P B E L L 55i (JUZ. if 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
C o u n t y of Salt LaJce 
ss. 
) 
On the ^ - " day of J^uly 1973^ p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d before m e 
C H A R L E S R. Kl frTON, who belntf f i r s t duly sworn, did d e p o s e apd « s y th*t 
h e JUB the P r e s i d e n t of KIRTON L A N D AND I N V E S T M E N T CORPORATION,, 
«und that b e e x e c u t e d the foregoing R e s t r i c t i v e C o v e n a u t B on twehull of ftat<3 
c o r p o r a t i o n *.Qd aclcnowladfed t o m c that B a c h c o r p o r a t i o n executed the a a j n e ; 
ntkd H A R O L D M . C A M P B E L L «cnd MARY C A M P B E L L , h i e w i f e , who b e i n g 
f i r m duly e w o r n on o a t h . acknowledged to m e that they an© the s igners o f 
t h e f o r e g o i n g R e s t r i c t i v e Covenant* . 
^>~: 
N o t a r y P n b l i £ in and lor t h e S i t e oTutar^: ) 
/ 
M y Coxnntf AigpT-MaplreiJ: 
R e s i d i n g m^-Salt L a k e C i t y r UDth 
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8 Covenants €=69(2) 
Even if subdivision's lestuctive covenant 
bailing human occupation of any "trailer, 
basement tent, shack, gaiage [or] bain' ex-
panded list of permissible structures beyond 
those enumerated in covenant limiting such 
structuies to single family homes, guest 
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets, 
building elected by subdivision resident foi 
use as wood shop and for storage did not fall 
within any descnption of permissible struc-
tui es contained m either covenant 
9 Co\enants€=>49 
Undei the well-established rule of con-
struction ejusdem generis, general language 
must be confined to its meaning by specific 
enumeration which proceeds it, unless a con-
trary intention is shown 
10 t e n a n t s 0=49 
It is the Supreme Court's duty to en-
force the intentions of covenanting parties as 
expressed m the plain language of the cove-
nants 
11 Co-t enants €=77 1 
Property owners who purchase land in 
developments subject to restnctive covenants 
have a right to enforce such covenants 
against other owners who violate them 
12 Covenants €=72 1 
Conduct by pioperty owneis within a 
development may terminate and render un-
enforceable a particular restnctive covenant 
where such conduct so substantially changes 
the character of the neighborhood as to neu-
tralize the benefit of the covenant oi consti-
tutes evidence of the abandonment of the 
covenant 
13 Covenants €=>72 1 
Abandonment of a restrictive covenant 
may be found where there has been substan-
tial and general noncompliance with the cove-
nant 
14 Covenants €=72 1 
In order to constitute abandonment of a 
restrictive covenant, the violations of the cov-
enant must be so substantial as to destroy its 
usefulness and support a finding that the 
covenant has become burdensome 
15 Covenants €=72 1 
If the original purpose of a restrictive 
covenant can still be accomplished despite 
violations, and substantial benefit will contin-
ue to inuie to resiaents, the covenant will 
sUnd 
16 Covenants c=122 
Evidence of abandonment of a restnc-
tive covenant must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence 
17 Covenants €=72 1 
No abandonment of a restnctive cove 
nant will be found wheie violations are of a 
minor nature and do not destroy the general 
building scheme, if the violations are slight, 
unimportant, and unsubstantial, or if the vio-
lations are inoffensive 
IS Covenants €=>72 1 
In determining whether violations of a 
particular restnctive covenant have resulted 
m its abandonment, tiie court must examine 
(1) the number, nature and seventy of tne 
then existing violations, (2) any prior act of 
enfoi cement of the i estnction and (3) wheth-
er it is still possible to r eahze to a substantial 
degree the benefits intended through the 
covenant 
19 Covenants o=72 1 
Erection of small storage sheas by 19 of 
52 property owners m subdivision, m viola-
tion of restnctive covenant limiting permissi-
ble structures to single family homes, guest 
houses, garages and outbuildings for pets 
did not result in abandonment of covenant, 
where storage sheds had average size of 
eight by ten feet and were approximately 
seven and one-half feet in height, were not 
placed on permanent foundations, were not 
inhabited and typically fit unobtrusively in 
back corner of lot 
20 Covenants €=72 1 
Approval by subdivision's architectural 
committee of building erected by property 
owner for use as wood shop and for storage 
did not relieve owner of obligation to comply 
with restnctive covenant limiting permissible 
structures to single family homes, guest 
houses garages, and outbuildings for pets 
Utah 809 
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family dwelling, a private garage, a guest 
house, and outbuildings for pets as herein-
after described.... 
With respect to setback requirements for 
outbuildings, article III requires: 
No outbuilding shall be erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain nearer than 
eight (S) feet to either side line of a lot 
unless no portion of said building extends 
nearer to the street line than sixty-five (65) 
feet. 
Finally, article VI prohibits the use of certain 
structures for human habitation on Quail 
Point lots: 
No trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, 
barn or other outbuilding erected on a 
building site covered by these covenants 
shall at any time be used for human habi-
tation temporarily or permanently, nor 
shall any structure of a temporary charac-
ter be used for human habitation. 
116 By 1997, before Erickson built his 
structure, there had been erected on approxi-
mately nineteen of fifty-two Quail Point lots 
small storage-type sheds and other similar 
structures that did not qualify as single-fami-
ly dwellings, private garages, guest houses, 
or outbuildings for pets. 
11 7 The Swensons appeal, contending that 
(1) the restnctive covenants prohibit the 
erection of Erickson's workshop; (2) Robert 
Campbell, the representative of the architec-
tural committee, did not have the authority 
to relieve Erickson of complying with the 
covenants, (3) if Campbell or the committee 
had that authority, Erickson did not obtain 
preapproval from him or the committee to 
erect the workshop as required by the cove-
nants; and (4) the notice of termination is 
invalid and cannot immediately terminate the 
covenants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] U8 This case comes to this court fol-
lowing the tnal court's grant of a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in favor of Erick-
son. However, in granting the 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, the trial court and the parties relied 
extensively on materials beyond the allega-
tions of the complaint. Where outside mat-
ters are ''presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and
 t disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
11 9 In their briefs and at oral arguments to 
this court, both parties again rely extensively 
on evidence from the preliminary hearing, 
affidavits, and supporting documents. Be-
cause from the outset the parties have sub-
mitted extraneous materials and treated the 
motion to dismiss 'as a motion for summary 
judgment, neither party was prejudiced or 
unfairly surpnsed by the trial court's implicit 
conversion of Erickson's 12(b)(6) motion into 
a motion for summary judgment. See DOIT, 
Inc v Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 
838-39 n. 3 (Utah 1996) (citing World Peace 
Movement of Am v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 256 n. 2 (Utah 1994); 
Warren v Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 
1127 n. 2 (Utah 1992), Johnson u Morton 
Thiokol Inc., SIS P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1991)) 
Therefore, we treat the trial court's order as 
a summary judgment for Erickson. 
[2] 1110 On review of a summary judg-
ment motion, we consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and affirm only where it appears that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material 
issues of fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. See Thayne 
v Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 
(Utah 1994) (citing Themy v Seagull Enters 
Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979)). We 
review the trial court's legal determinations 
for correctness. See Geisdorf v. Doughty, 
972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998). 
ANALYSIS 
I. STRUCTURES PROHIBITED 
UNDER THE RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 
[3-6] Ull We first address whether 
Quail Point's restrictive covenants prohibit 
the erection of Erickson's workshop. Re" 
strictive covenants that run with the land and 
SWENSON v. ERICKSON 
Cite as 998 ?.2d 807 (Utah 2000} 
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inber subdivision lots form a contract 
een subdivision property owners as a 
e and individual lot owners; therefore,-
•pretation of the covenants is governed 
he same rules of construction as those 
I to interpret contracts. See South Shore 
%es Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's, 219 Kan. 
549 P.2d 1035, 1042- (1976); Gosnay v. 
Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 
j 1247, 1250 (1983); Tompkins v. Butt-
i Constr. Co. of Neu, 99 Nev. 142, 659 
i S65, 866 (1983); 9 Richard R. Powell, 
jell on Real Property § 60.05, at 60-82 
.trick J. Rohan ed., 1998); 20 Am.Jur.2d 
tenants § 170, at 591 (1995). Generally, 
ambiguous restrictive covenants should be 
forced as written. However, where re-
•ictive covenants are susceptible, to two or 
,)re reasonable interpretations, the inten-
>n of the parties is controlling. See Powell,-
.pro, § 60.05, at 60-82. The intention of 
e parties is ascertained from the document 
self and the language used within the docu-
ent. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC As-
)c, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Powell, 
ipra, § 60.05, at 60-82. 
[7] H 12 Article I of the covenants pro-
ides in relevant part, "No structure shall be 
Itered, placed or permitted to remain on any 
residential lot' other than one detached sin-
gle family dwelling, a private garage, a guest 
louse, and outbuildings for pets as hereinaf-
:er described." The parties do not dispute 
that Erickson's workshop does not fit neatly 
within those four types of structures. The 
confusion surrounding what structures' may 
be erected arises from language contained in 
other articles of the covenants. Specifically, 
article VI requires that "[n]o trailer, base-
ment, tent, shack, garage, barn or other out-
building erected on a building site covered by 
these covenants shall at any time be used for 
human habitation temporarily or permanent-
ly, nor shall any structure of a temporary 
character be used for human habitation." 
Article • III addresses outbuildings further, • 
requiring that a[n]o outbuilding shall be 
erected, altered, placed or permitted to re-
main nearer than eight (8) feet to either side 
tae of a lot unless no portion of said building 
extends nearer to the street line than sixty-
five (65) feet" On the basis of its reading of 
articles VI and III, and in an effort to give 
effect to the covenants as a whole, the trial 
court held that, as a matter of law, the 
covenants do not prohibit the building of 
Erickson's workshop. The court reasoned 
that the term "outbuildings for pets" in arti-
cle-1 "is not limited to those buildings that 
only house pets, but, rather, the term in-
cludes trailers, tents, shacks, garages, barns, 
and the like." The trial court's interpreta-
tion of the language of a restrictive covenant, 
absent resort to extrinsic evidence, presents 
a question of law which we review for cor-
rectness. See, e.g., Buehner, 752 P.2d at 895. 
1113 The Swensons contend that article I 
specifically limits what structures may be 
built in Quail Point. Article VI, although 
referring to other buildings, specifically pro-
hibits human habitation and does not expand 
the types of structures permitted under arti-
cle L Therefore, the Swensons argue, specific 
limitations in article I prescribing the struc-
tures Quail Point owners may build should 
prevail over the general language of article 
VI prohibiting the use of certain structures 
for .human habitation. Erickson contends 
that if only the four types of structures in 
article L are permitted, the terms used in 
article. VI (i.e., trailer, tent, shack, barn, or 
other outbuilding) are rendered superfluous. 
He also argues that the use of the term 
"outbuilding" in article III and its concern 
that outbuildings not be located within eight 
feet of a lot's side line unless they are sixty-
five feet from the street implicitly suggests 
that the drafters of the covenants intended to 
allow outbuildings other than for pets, such 
as sheds, barns, and workshops. 
[S] 1114 A plain reading of articles I and 
VI reveals two distinct purposes. Article I's 
primary purpose is to limit the types of 
structures permitted on a residential lot in 
Quaih Point. On this point, article I is clear 
and unambiguous; Quail Point homeowners 
may erect four permanent structures on their 
lots: (1) a single family dwelling; (2) a pri-
vate garage; (3) a guest house; and (4) 
outbuildings for pets. Article VVs primary 
purpose is to prohibit human habitation of 
any structures other than a main dwelling or 
a guest house, as permitted by article I. 
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1115 Close scrutiny of the language m arti-
cle VI, however, diminishes the apparent in-
consistency between article I and article VI. 
Use of the terra "building site" instead of 
"residential lot" in article VI suggests that 
the di afters were concerned with preventing 
either buiiders or future homeowners from 
living in partially completed buildings (e.g., 
basements, garages, shacks, barns, or other 
outbuildings) or movable structures (e.g., 
trailers or tents) during prolonged construc-
tion on a residential lot or other unforeseen 
delay, or with preventing homeowners from 
changing the single-family residential charac-
ter of the subdivision by having persons oc-
cupy buildings other than the main dwelling 
or guest house. The fact that article VI lists 
three permanent structures (i.e., shacks, 
barns, or other outbuildings) not otherwise 
allowed under article I is not deteimiinative, 
as the overriding intent of article VI is to 
prevent human habitation of additional struc-
tures 
[9] 1116 It is also evident from the lan-
guage of the covenants that Enckson's work-
shop does not fit neatly within the common 
and ordinary meaning of "trailer, basement, 
tent, shack, garage [or] bam" contained in 
article VI. Accordingly, even assuming that 
article VI expands the allowable structures 
under the covenants, the only term that could 
be read to allow the erection of Enckson's 
workshop is "other outbuildings." 2 It is not 
this court's practice to override specific lan-
guage with general provisions dealing with 
wholly distinct subject matter. Under the 
well-established rule of construction ejusdem 
genens, general language must be confined 
to its meaning by specific enumeration which 
proceeds it, unless a contrary intention is 
shown. See Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 
419, 421-22, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959); Edwin 
Q. Patterson, The Interpretation and Con-
struction of Contracts, 64 Colum. L.Rev. 
833, 853 (1964). Here, no contrary intention 
is shown by any language of the covenants, 
and allowing the expansive reading put forth 
by Enckson would render the clear and ex-
plicit limitation in article I meaningless. The 
effect of Enckson's position would be to ex-
2. Generally, an outbuilding is something which 
is to be used in connection with a main building 
pand the four explicit allowable structures in 
article I to an infinite number of structures 
that could be said to qualify as "other out-
buildings" under article VI. The drafters 
could not have intended such a result. 
1117 Finally, Erickson argues that because 
article III i-equires that no outbuilding be 
erected nearer than eight feet to either side 
line of a lot unless no portion of the building 
is within sixty-five feet of the street line 
suggests that Enckson's workshop is permis-
sible under the covenants. According to Er-
ickson, "[I]t is ludicrous to believe that the 
drafters of the covenants were concerned 
that a dog house might be located nearer to 
the street than 65 feet" 
11 IS Erickson's interpretation of article III 
is untenable. Firsi, article III does not con-
tradict the explicit limitations in article I on 
those structures that Quail Point lot owners 
may build. Article I allows a single family 
dwelling, a guest house, a private garage, 
and outbuildings for pets, and in no way 
contradicts article IITs requirement that 
these outbuildings be erected no closer than 
eight feet from either side line of a lot unless 
they are sixty-five feet from the street line 
Second, article III does not prohibit the loca-
tion of outbuildings within sixty-five feet of 
the street line, as Erickson suggests. An 
outbuilding must be at least sixty-five feet 
from the street line only if it is within eight 
feet of the side line of the lot. 
[10] 1119 Finally, it is not for this court to 
second-guess the judgment of covenanting 
parties by including setback requirements for 
particular structures. It is this court's duty 
to enforce the intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the plain language of the cove-
nants See Freeman v Gee, IS Utah 2d 339, 
345, 423 P.2d 155, 159 (1967). The most 
reasonable interpretation of the Quail Point 
covenants is that they expressly prohibit the 
erection of Erickson's building because it is 
not a single family dwelling, a guest house, a 
pnvate garage, or an outbuilding for pets. 
II. ABANDONMENT OF RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 
11 20 Erickson contends that even if article 
I prohibits his structure, that covenant has 
or which is subservient to it, although distinct 
therefrom 20 AmJur 2d Covenants § 181 
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been abandoned by Quail Point owners. We 
therefore address whether Quail Point lot 
owners have abandoned the restrictions, as 
evidenced by their construction of numerous 
other structures, mainly small storage-type 
sheds and other similar structures, since re-
cording the covenants in 1973. 
[11,12] 5)21 Restnctive covenants are a 
common method of effectuating private resi-
dential developmental schemes See Powell, 
supra, § 60.06[3], at 60-104 to 60-112. 
Property owners who purchase land in such 
developments have a right to enforce such 
covenants against other owners who violate 
them See Cnmmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 
478, 480-81 (Utah 1981); Powell, supra. 
$ 60.07[c], at 60-121. Conduct by property 
owners within a development, however, may 
terminate and render unenforceable a partic-
ular covenant where such conduct so sub-
stantially changes ihe character of the neigh-
borhood as to neutralize the benefit of the 
covenant, see Cnmmins, 636 P.2d at 479, or 
constitutes evidence of the abandonment of 
the covenant. See Fink v Miller, 896 P.2d 
649, 653 (Utah Ct App 1995) 
[13-16] 51 22 The case law is uniform that 
before an abandonment of a covenant may be 
found there must be "substantial and general 
noncompliance" with the covenant. B.B.P 
Co?-]? v. Carroll, 760 P.2d 519, 524 (Alaska 
1988); Tompkins, 659 P2d at 867 One 
court has stated that in order for there to be 
an abandonment, a covenant must be "habit-
ually and substantially violated " Reading v 
Keller, 67 Wash.2d 86, 406 P.2d 634, 637 
(1965) (internal quotations omitted). The vi-
olations must be so substantia] as to destroy 
the usefulness of the covenant and support a 
finding that the covenant has become bur-
densome. See Keller v Branton, 667 P.2d 
650, 654 (Wyo.1983). If the onginal purpose 
of the covenant can still be accomplished and 
substantial benefit will continue to inure to 
residents, the covenant will stand. See 
Tompkins, 659 P.2d at 867. This court in 
Papamkolas Brothers Enterprises u Sugar-
house Shopping Center Associates, 535 P 2d 
1256 (Utah 1975), in determining whether a 
covenant should no longer be enforceable 
because of changed conditions, stated: 
Before a change will vitiate a covenant, it 
must be of such a magnitude as to neutral-
ize the benefits of the restriction, to the 
point of defeating the object and purpose 
of the restrictive covenant. The change 
required to afford relief is reached, where 
the circumstances render the covenant of 
little or no value Here, the purpose of the 
restriction is yet a valid one, and the con-
templated benefits to the plaintiff still ex-
ist. The purpose of the covenant has nei-
ther ceased nor become useless. 
Id at 1261 (citing Metropolitan Inv Co. v. 
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 41, 376 P.2d 940, 943 
(1962)). Evidence of abandonment must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. 
See Metropolitan, 14 Utah 2d at 41, 376 P.2d 
at 943. 
[17] 1T E3 Courts are uniform that no 
abandonment of a covenant will be found 
where violations aie of a "minor nature" and 
do not destroy the general building scheme, 
see Reading, 406 P2d at 636; if the viola-
tions are "slight, unimportant, and unsub-
stantial/' Guyton v Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 
So.2d 365, 371 (I960); or if the violations are 
"inoffensive'' See Keller, 667 P.2d at 654 
*il 24 Typical of the cases where an aban-
donment of a covenant has been found is 
BB.P., 760 P.2d 519. There, a covenant 
required all lot owners to cut and destroy all 
poplar, Cottonwood, and aspen trees on their 
lots to make room for the more desirable 
spruce and birch. See id. at 520. However, 
lot owners learned through experience that 
strict compliance was impossible because 
poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees are ex-
tremely hardy, and they sprout from roots 
and reseed themselves Even bulldozing all 
of those trees would not bring a lot into 
compliance because they would soon spring 
back, and bulldozing would cause excessive 
erosion. See id at 521. As a result, none of 
the lots were in full compliance with the 
covenant, and only eighteen of the approxi-
mately eighty-eight residents had taken sub-
stantial steps towaz-d compliance See id 
The court held that the covenant had been 
abandoned because the evidence revealed 
substantial and general noncompliance. The 
court noted that in order to fully comply, 
each resident would be required to cut and 
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thin trees each year, far exceeding the cut-
ting that was apparently contemplated by the 
covenant originally. Thus, the residents 
would be subject to a far heavier burden than 
they originally bargained for. Full compli-
ance was found to be impossible to achieve 
and even substantial compliance would be 
extremely burdensome. See id at 524. 
1125 In contrast to that case where an 
abandonment of a covenant was found, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Keller, 667 P.2d 
650, found no abandonment of a covenant 
which prohibited front yard fencing. Twenty 
lots out of approximately 120 to 130 lots had 
some kind of front yard fence. They were 
decorative fences, and the court held that 
they were not fences in the ordinary sense of 
indicating boundaries or holding something 
in or out. See id at 654. The court empha-
sized that in order to find an abandonmeni of 
a protective covenant, the breaches ac-
quiesced in must be so great or so fundamen-
tal or radical as to neutralize the benefit of 
the restriction to the point of defeating the 
purpose of the covenant "In other words, 
the violations must be so substantial as to 
support a finding that the usefulness of the 
covenant has been destroyed, or that the 
covenant has become valueless to the proper-
ty owners." Id 
1126 Courts have also found that the erec-
tion of churches in a subdivision restricted to 
residential purposes technically violated the 
covenant, but the violation was too slight and 
inconsequential to effect material change, 
character, and use of the restricted territory. 
See, eg., Mechhng v Dawson, 234 Ky. 318, 
28 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1930) Similarly, in Cowl-
ing v Colhgan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943 
(1958), the Supreme Court of Texas held that 
even though the subdivision had allowed sev-
eral churches to be built there in violation of 
a covenant restricting the use of the lots for 
residential purposes the violation was so triv-
ial in character that it did not operate as a 
waiver of the right of lot owners to enforce 
the covenant against business or commercial 
development, and it did not indicate an aban-
donment of the covenant. See id. at 946. 
[18] 1127 Thus, we adopt the test articu-
lated by the court of appeals in Fink, 896 
P.2d 649 for determining whether the owners 
in Quail Point Subdivision have abandoned 
the restrictive covenants. We must examine: 
(1) the "number, nature and severity of the 
then existing violations"; (2) "any prior act of 
enforcement of the restriction"; and (3) 
"whether it is still possible to realize to a 
substantial degree the benefits intended 
through the covenant." Id at 653-54. 
[19] 1128 In the instant case, nineteen of 
fifty-two Quail Point lots had garden and 
storage sheds that did not comply with the 
four building types allowed under article I. 
While the building of small storage sheds 
may technically violate article I, the violation 
is unsubstantial. The evidence indicates that 
the storage sheds have an average size of 
eight by ten feet and are approximately sev-
en and a half feet in height, having an aver-
age of ninety-one square feet. These small 
sheds typically fit unobtrusively in a back 
corner of the lot, not on a foundation, and are 
used to store garden and yard tools. They 
are not occupied by lot owners and could be 
not much larger than an outbuilding for pets, 
which is expressly allowed under the cove-
nant. 
11 29 On the other hand, the woodshop built 
by defendant Erickson stands twelve feet 
high and is substantially larger than a stor-
age shed. The building contains at least 288 
square feet and may be as large as 384 
square feet. It has a foundation and is occu-
pied by Erickson for woodworking Erick-
son testified that he intends to move his 
bandsaw into the workshop and buy other 
power tools. The Swensons' and Erickson's 
lots adjoin at the rear. The Swensons are 
directly impacted by the large structure built 
by Erickson 
11 30 There is a substantial difference be-
tween a small, unobtrusive, unoccupied and 
readily movable storage shed in the corner of 
a lot and a substantially larger and taller 
woodworking shop The technical violation 
of the covenant here, the small storage 
sheds, can in no wise be deemed an abandon-
ment. The original purpose of the covenant 
can still be accomplished, and substantial 
benefit can continue to mure to residents of 
the subdivision. The slight violation by lot 
owners in erecting small, unoccupied storage 
SWENSON v. ERICKSON 
Cite as 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000) 
sheds does not render the covenant useless, the committee 
See Papamkolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1261. 
There is no other occupied structure in the 
subdivision comparable to the large shop 
built by Erickson in which to conduct wood-
working. We thus conclude that there has 
been no abandonment of the restrictive cove-
nants by the lot owners. 
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III. APPROVAL OF PLANS 
[20] 17 31 In article I of the covenants, 
provision is made for the appointment and 
duties of an architectural committee-
No building shall be erected, placed, or 
altered on any premises in said develop-
ment until the building plans, specifica-
tions, and plot plans showing the location 
of such building have been approved as to 
conformity and harmony of external design 
with existing structures in the develop-
ment, and as LO location of the building 
with respect to topography and finished 
ground elevation by an architectural com-
mittee composed of CHARLES R KIR-
TON and other members selected by him 
or by a representative designated by the 
members of said committee 
After the district court granted a temporary 
restraining order and a preliminary injunc-
tion against Erickson, and after he had erect-
ed his workshop, he sought to comply with 
this covenant. Mary Campbell and Charles 
R. Kirton, the two surviving members of the 
original architectural committee, designated 
Robert Campbell as the committee's repre-
sentative. Robert Campbell then formally 
approved Erickson's shed. However, this 
approval avails Erickson nothing, for two 
reasons. 
D32 First, the covenant requires that the 
architectural committee or its designated 
representative approve the building plan pri-
or to the erection of any building on the lots. 
That was not done here. Approval came 
after the workshop had been erected. Sec-
ondly and more seriously, the restrictive cov-
enant does not purport to give the architec-
tural committee authority to relieve any lot 
owner of a duty to comply. There is no 
language in the covenant that could be con-
strued to giYe such sweeping authority to the 
committee. Instead, the covenant grants to 
the authority to examine 
building plans, specifications, and plot plans 
in order to determine "conformity and har-
mony of external design with existing struc-
tures" and location of the proposed building 
with respect to topography and finished 
ground elevation. The architectural commit-
tee can perform those duties without violat-
ing the covenants with regard to the four 
types of buildings allowed. 
IV. TERMINATION OF 
THE COVENANTS 
[21] 11 33 Erickson contends that even if 
the committee's approval of his structure is 
invalid, the lot owners effectively terminated 
the covenants. Erickson circulated a petition 
that thirty-eight of the fifty-two homeowners 
signed, giving their approval of the termi-
nation of the covenants Article XIV of the 
covenants provides: 
These covenants are to run with the land 
and shall be binding on all parties claiming 
under them until January 1. 1994, at which 
time said covenants shall be automatically-
extended for successive periods of 10 years 
unless by vote of a majority of the then 
owners of the building sites covered by 
these covenants it is agreed to change said 
covenants in whole or part 
11 34 Erickson argues that the petition con-
stitutes the owners' majority vote to termi-
nate the covenants. However, looking at the 
plain language of the article, the covenants 
are to be "automatically extended unless 
by vote of a majority of the then owners "^ 
(Emphasis added) Therefore, the owners 
have the power to amend the covenants, but 
only at such time as the covenants are due 
fpr^ e-x-tens-ioh The "last such time was Janu-
ary 1, 1994; "we assume that the next such 
time will be on January 1, 2004. This being 
so, the petition, assuming it represents a 
majority vote of the owners, is still invalid. 
The owners' attempted termination of the , 
Restrictive covenants is without effect 
V. ATTORNEY FEES 
11 35 There is no provision in the covenants 
for an award of attorney fees to any owner 
who successfully seeks enforcement of the 
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covenants The Swensons contend, howevei 
that they aie entitled to attorney fees undei 
our wrongful hen statute, Utah Code Ann 
<? 38-9-7 (1997) They asseit that the notice 
of teimination oi the lestnctive covenants 
recoided by Robeit Campbell in the office of 
the recoidei of Salt Lake County constitutes 
a wrongful hen within the meaning of our 
statute We disagiee Undei section 38-9-
1(6), a wiongful hen is defined as ' <iny docu-
ment that purpoits to create a hen oi en-
cumbrance on an ownei s interest in leal 
propeity" The notice of teimination did not 
purport to place a hen or encumbrance on 
the Swensons pioperty Then claim foi at 
torney fees is without merit 
CONCLUSION 
11 36 The oi der of the trial com t dissolving 
the preliminary injunction against Enckson 
and dismissing plaintiffs complaint against 
him is reveised The case is lemanded to 
tire inal court to enter a permanent injunc-
tion against Enckson and for any furthei 
proceedings in accordance with this opimon 
1137 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, 
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice 
RUSSON concm m Chief Justice HOV\ E s 
opinion 
11 3S Justice STEWART concurs in tne 
r esult 
2000 UT3S 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v 
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Supieme Court of Utah 
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Defendant was convicted in the Thud 
District Court bait Lake Department, Judith 
SH Atherton J of aggravated assault 
Defendant appealed Defendant filed motion 
for surnmaiy reversal upon discovery that 
videotape of second day of trial had been lost 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT OCT 2 5 2004 
DAVID and BARBRA SWENSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID ERICKSON, and DAVID 
LIMBERG, 
Defendants <. 
I 
Oral arguments on plaintiffs ' Motion To Nullify Termination of 
Restrictive Covenants were heard on September 20, 2004. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. Now, having considered the parties1 arguments along 
with the relevant legal authorities the Court rules as stated 
herein and denies plaintiffs' motion. 
This action revolves around the Quail Point Subdivision 
Restrictive Covenants, originally filed with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on July 9, 1973. In 1997, Quail Point lot owner David 
Erickson commenced construction of a storage shed on his property. 
In response, Quail Point lot owners David and Barbara Swenson 
("plaintiffs") brought an action in Third District Court to enjoin 
Mr. Erickson's construction as a violation of Article I of the 
subdivision's restrictive covenants.l 
'Under Article I of the restrictive covenants, no structure 
shall be: "erected, placed or altered on any premises in [Quail 
Point] until the building plans, specifications, and plot plans 
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After an injunction was entered, Mr. Erickson attempted to 
terminate the covenants by filing a Notice of Termination based 
upon a vote of lot owners. The Third District Court dismissed the 
case and plaintiffs' appealed. In a written decision, the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Erickson's attempt to terminate 
the covenants was ineffective and remanded the case to the District 
Court for entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting Erickson from 
building the shed on his Quail Point lot. Swenson v Erickson 2000 
UT 16, 998 P.2d 807. 
On January 1, 2 0 04 Quail Point subdivision lot owners again 
voted to terminate the restrictive covenants. A majority voted to 
terminate the covenants and a Notice of Termination was recorded 
with Salt Lake County on March 26, 2004. In response to the Notice 
of Termination, plaintiffs now bring this Motion To Nullify against 
David Erickson and David Limberg ("defendants"), challenging the 
termination on iwo main grounds: (1; une covenants do ncu allow for 
"termination" by majority vote; and (2) the covenants were 
automatically renewed for a successive ten (10) year period on 
January 1, 2 0 04. 
As an initial matter, the Court rejects plaintiffs contention 
showing the location of such building have been approved as to 
conformity and harmony of external design with existing 
structures in the development, and as to location of the.building 
with respect to topography and finished ground elevation, by an 
architectural committee. . ." 
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that the termination was ineffective because the covenants only 
allow for a "change" and not a "termination" by majority vote. 
Article XIV of the restrictive covenants states in relevant part, 
"[tjhese covenants are to run with the land 
and shall be binding on all parties and all 
persons claiming under them until January 1, 
1994 at which time said covenants shall be 
automatically extended for successive periods 
of 10 years unless by a vote of a majority of 
the then owners of the building sites 
covered by these covenants it is agreed to 
change said covenants in whole or part." 
(Emphasis added). 
This Court concludes that the phrase "in whole or part" allows for 
termination of the covenants, as a whole, by majority vote. Such 
conclusion, is consistent wiuh the plain language of the covenants. 
Next, the Swensons ' argue that the termination vote should 
have occurred prior to January 1, 2004. Specifically, the 
Swensons' contend that the automatic renewal period engaged on 
January 1st, 2 004 and that any amendments to, or termination of, the 
covenants is not available for another ten years. In Swenson at 
K 34 the Utah Supreme Court states: 
"[t]he owners have the power to amend the 
covenants, but only at such time as the covenants 
are due for extension. The last such time was 
January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such time 
will be on January 1, 2004." (Emphasis added) . 
The phrase uon January 1, 2004" indicates that the Utah Court 
previously determined that a vote conducted and tallied on that 
date was valid. Accordingly, the January 1, 2004 ruling was 
effective and the covenants were terminated. 
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Plaintiff's Motion is hereby denied. 
BY THE COURT: 
